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Abstract
The Great Recession and the subsequent European crisis may have long-lasting effects 
on aggregate demand, aggregate supply and, hence, on macroeconomic performance 
over the medium and long run. Besides the fact that fi nancial crises last longer and are 
succeeded by slower recoveries, and apart from the hysteresis effects that may operate 
after episodes of long-term unemployment, the combination of high (public and private) debt 
and low population and productivity growth may create signifi cant constraints for monetary 
and  fi scal policies. In this paper I develop an OLG model, one earlier used by Eggertsson 
and Mehrotra (2014) to rationalise the «secular stagnation hypothesis», to show how 
high debt and low population and productivity growth may condition the macroeconomic 
performance of some European countries over the medium and long run.
Keywords: natural rate of interest, zero lower bound, population and productivity growth, 
inter-generational transfers, secular stagnation.
JEL classifi cation: E20, E43, E52, E66.
Resumen
La Gran Recesión y la crisis europea pueden haber generado efectos persistentes sobre la 
demanda y la oferta agregada y, por tanto, sobre el comportamiento macroeconómico en el 
medio y largo plazo. Aparte de que las crisis fi nancieras pueden durar más y son seguidas 
por recuperaciones más débiles, y de que pueden aparecer efectos de histéresis asociados 
a períodos con una alta incidencia del desempleo de larga duración, la combinación de 
una deuda elevada (pública y privada) con bajas tasas de crecimiento demográfi co y de 
productividad puede dar lugar a restricciones considerables para las políticas monetaria 
y fi scal. En este documento se utiliza un modelo de generaciones solapadas, —similar 
al utilizado por Eggertsson y Mehrotra (2014) para ilustrar la posibilidad de un equilibrio 
con «estancamiento secular»— para mostrar cómo una deuda elevada y bajas tasas de 
crecimiento de la población y de productividad pueden condicionar el comportamiento 
macroeconómico de algunos países europeos en el medio y largo plazo.
Palabras clave: tasa natural de interés, crecimiento demográfi co y de la productividad, 
transferencias intergeneracionales, estancamiento secular.
Códigos JEL: E20, E43, E52, E66.
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Long-Lasting Consequences
of the European Crisis
Juan F. Jimeno
Non-Technical Summary
Almost eight years after the financial turmoil that signalled the start of the
recent economic crisis, GDP and employment are still below their pre-crisis
levels in many European countries. Slow and jobless recoveries, if they may
even be termed recoveries, are being observed throughout Europe. In broader
terms, the economic literature approaches the causes of these slow recoveries
by: i) addressing the financial origins of the crisis, ii) emphasising transmission
mechanisms through which temporary negative shocks may have long-lasting
effects, and iii) revisiting the "secular stagnation hypothesis", that hints at the
possibility that a temporary deleveraging shock yields a permanent liquidity
trap in which demand is permanently too low and real interest rates sufficiently
negative for monetary policy to be permanently constrained by the Zero Lower
Bound on policy interest rates.
Indeed, the European economy has to face the legacy of the Great Reces-
sion in a low growth scenario, due to population ageing, and diminished ex-
pectations of productivity growth. Moreover, demographic prospects may have
significant economic consequences, affecting to patterns of consumption and po-
tential growth (both through employment and TFP growth). This paper shows
how the interaction of the legacy of the crisis with log-run trends in the world
economy prevailing in the pre-crisis period (mostly the decline of population and
of productivity growth rates) may give raise to a protracted period of subdued
growth and high unemployment.
The analytical framework is a simple OLG model with public debt and ex-
ogenous technical progress. In this model a deleveraging shock has long-lasting
effects through the savings decision of households. As households accumulate
less debt, savings increase and the natural interest rate falls, plausibly below
zero when population and TFP growth are low. If then monetary policy is either
unwilling or unable to accommodate a negative real interest rate by increasing
inflation, then the zero lower bound on policy interest rates binds and unemploy-
ment rises. Moreover, if household anticipate lower population and productivity
growth, savings increase further, increasing the pressure on real interest rates to
fall. Hence lower population and productivity growth interact with deleveraging
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nominal and real wage rigidities, lead unemployment to increase and persist at
high levels. In particular, the model highlights the following:
• As population growth falls, the natural interest rate falls, since there are
fewer young people demanding credit, and expected transfers to the old
generation also fall, since the relative size of the middle generation to
finance those transfers will be smaller. This implies lower future income
for the old generation and, thus, an increase in savings that pushes down
the natural interest rate even further.
• A higher current productivity growth rate increases savings since it allows
the middle generation to pay for its accumulated debt while young, using
a lower fraction of their income, and hence, disposable income available
for savings is higher, and the natural rate is lower. Higher productivity
growth in the future decreases savings, since expected transfers to the old
generation are higher, for given tax rates and deb ratios, and, thus, the
natural interest rate is higher.
• A fall in the price of capital or a higher depreciation rate decrease the equi-
librium real interest rate, since future income downwards by the middle
generation is lower, and, hence, its savings are higher.
• The lower the demand for credit by the young generation, the lower the
equilibrium real interest rate. Also, the lower the private debt accumulated
by the middle generation while young, the higher savings are, and, thus,
the lower the natural rate is.
• A higher current tax rate crowds out savings by lowering disposable in-
come, and, hence, increases the natural rate. A higher next-period tax rate
also crowds out savings by increasing expected future income, also push-
ing the natural rate up. As for the debt ratios, the current one increases
the demand for loans, while the future one, increases expected transfers
to the older generation, so that high debt ratios push the natural rate up.
• Fiscal policy can affect the natural interest rate only by modifying inter-
generational transfers. For instance, decreasing the burden of debt and
pension expenditures on future generations decrease savings and increase
the natural rate of interest.
The second part of the paper provides data on the demographic outlooks,
capital accumulation and productivity growth, and public and private debt with
the goal of signalling to what extent the type of relationships among the macro-
economic variables highlighted above may condition future growth in Europe.
Among all the factors determining the natural interest rate, only a revival of
productivity growth seems within the scope of policy to revert this situation.
to push the natural interest rate downwards, and for a given inflation rate and
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the economy is entering a period in which the "cyclical fluctuations would be
minor relative to more permanent trends", or more drastically, as Alvin Hansen
stated, this time indeed "the Western world is undergoing in this generation a
structural change no less basic and profound in character than that transforma-
tion of economic life and institutions which we are wont to designate loosely by
the phrase "the Industrial Revolution" ’.
This is perhaps why "structural reforms " are back at the top of proposals for
policy agendas across all the European countries. But even with structural re-
forms yielding higher productivity growth, it seems that, as L. Summers put it,
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The swift stream of events in the last quarter century offers, how-
ever, overwhelming testimony in support of the thesis that the eco-
nomic order of the Western world is undergoing in this generation a
structural change no less basic and profound in character than that
transformation of economic life and institutions which we are wont
to designate loosely by the phrase "the Industrial Revolution". ...We
are moving swiftly out of the order in which those of our generation
were brought up, into no one knows what. (A. Hansen, "Economic
Progress and Declining Population Growth", American Economic
Review, vol. 29, 1939)
Indeed, I think it is fair to say that today, the amplitude of
fluctuations appears large, not small...there is room for doubt about
whether the cycle actually cycles (L. Summers, "U.S. Economic Prospects:
Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound", Busi-
ness Economics, vol. 49,2, 2014)
1 Introduction
The Great Recession was more intense and protracted than the typical reces-
sion.1 And, in some European countries, it was followed by a debt crisis that
pushed them into a very deep recession. Currently, almost eight years after the
financial turmoil that signalled the start of the recent economic crisis, GDP and
employment are still below their pre-crisis levels. Slow and jobless recoveries,
if they may even be termed recoveries, are being observed in many European
countries.
An indication of the special features of the Great Recession and the Euro-
pean crisis is the high number of research papers on its long-run impacts on
many socioeconomic variables such as consumption, investment, productivity,
the labour market, fertility,... 2 In broader terms, the economic literature ap-
proaches the causes of the slow recoveries after this episode taking three different
routes.3 First, one avenue of research attempts to link the causes of the slow
recovery to the financial origin of the crisis, resorting to some characteristics of
1The term “Great Recession” usually applies to both the U.S. recession — officially lasting
from December 2007 to June 2009 — and the ensuing global recession in 2009. Since this paper
focuses mostly on the European situation, the term "Great Recession" is used to refer to the
sequence of events starting with the financial crisis in late 2007, and continuing with global
recession in 2009 and the European debt crisis that followed in early 2010.
2 See, for instance, Crawford, Jin and Simpson (2013) on investment, Fernald (2014) on
productivity, and Goldstein, Kreyenfled, Jasilioniene, and Orsal (2013) on fertility. As for
the labour market, there are three reasons why the effects may last longer than usual: i)
slower labour reallocation under a credit crunch (see Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger 2013),
ii) a higher increase in long-term unemployment (see Casado, Fernandez and Jimeno, 2015),
and iii) a higher incidence of unemployment on youth high-skilled workers (see Bell and
Blanchflower, 2011, and Casado, Fernández and Jimeno, 2015).
3For a survey of alternative viewpoints on the causes of sluggish growth after the recent
financial crisis, see Lo and Rogoff (2014).
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the financial sector that make the original factors leading to the Great Reces-
sion (bursting of housing bubbles, prolonged deleveraging, and banking crises)
long-lasting.4 Secondly, there are other papers that emphasise transmission
mechanisms through which temporary negative shocks may have long-lasting
effects, such as, for instance, unemployment hysteresis or changes in expecta-
tions giving raise to long-lasting non-fundamental shocks.5 Thirdly, there is the
revival of the "secular stagnation hypothesis", which Eggertsson and Mehrotra
(2014) have formalised in a model that illustrates the possibility that a tempo-
rary deleveraging shock yields a permanent liquidity trap in which demand is
permanently too low and real interest rates sufficiently negative for monetary
policy to be permanently constrained by the Zero Lower Bound on policy inter-
est rates.6 While the financial nature of the crisis and the existence of hysteresis
mechanisms may be relevant for understanding the transmission and persistence
of shocks, they do not explain: i) why demand and growth prospects remain
subdued even after the financial sector has been repaired in many countries,
and ii) why long-lasting effects are now more of a concern than in previous
recessions. Hence, the medium and long-run effects of the European crisis seem
to be more related to structural trends that severely constrain macroeconomic
policies and economic growth.
Indeed, the legacy of the Great Recession is oppressive: i) high debt (pri-
vate and public), ii) high unemployment and depressed earnings (decline of the
middle class), iii) a significant fraction of capital stock that will not be easy to
reallocate, and iv) a financial sector with an increasing cost of credit and, hence,
less profitable investment projects to fund. These difficulties will have to be ad-
dressed in a scenario marked by low growth, due to population ageing, and di-
minished expectations of productivity growth. Moreover, demographic prospects
may have significant economic consequences, affecting patterns of consumption
and potential growth (through employment and TFP growth). Additionally,
in the EMU, competitiveness imbalances, built-up during the pre-crisis period,
have to be corrected through changes in nominal wages, precisely at the time
when nominal rigidities and the zero lower bound bind and, thus, wage cuts are
most costly.
The main goal of this paper is to show how the interaction of the legacy
of the crisis with long-run trends in the world economy prevailing in the pre-
crisis period (mostly the decline of population and of productivity growth rates)
gives rise to a long-lasting period of subdued growth and high unemployment To
do so, I develop a simple OLG model, a version of Eggertsson and Mehrotra’s
(2014) model extended to include public debt and exogenous technical progress.
In this model a deleveraging shock has long-lasting effects through the savings
decisions of households. As households accumulate less debt, savings increase
and the natural interest rate falls, plausibly below zero. If then monetary policy
4See Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Queraltó (2013).
5On hysteresis effects during the Great Recession, see Ball (2014). On other long-lasting
effects to the US economy, see Hall (2014a). On the response to non-fundamental shocks, see
Scmith-Grohe and Uribe (2012).
6 See also Summers (2014).
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is either unwilling or unable to accommodate a negative real interest rate by
increasing inflation, then the zero lower bound on policy interest rates binds and
unemployment rises. Moreover, if households anticipate lower population and
productivity growth, savings increase further, increasing the pressure on real
interest rates to fall. Hence lower population and productivity growth interact
with deleveraging to push the natural interest rate downwards, and for a given
inflation rate and nominal and real wage rigidities, to increase unemployment
and make it persist at high levels. In some sense, this interaction connects the
literature on the effects of demographic changes on interest rates and on inflation
(see Kara and von Thadden, 2014, and Carvalho and Ferrero, 2014) with papers
looking at the effects of deleveraging shocks (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2012,
Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012, and Huo and Rios-Rull, 2013).
The structure of the paper is as follows. First (in Section 2) I present the
model, and identify the main factors that may cause a protracted recession
similar to that observed in many European countries. In contrast to Eggertsson
and Mehrotra (2014) I neglect steady state analysis and focus on the main
factors that may lead the economy to fall into a liquidity trap and that make
that situation long-lasting. The second part of the paper (Section 3) documents
how some European countries fare with these factors (population ageing, low
productivity growth, and high debt) that may give raise to long-lasting effects of
the crisis, and, hence, it provides a first step towards the quantitative assessment
of the persistence mechanisms and structural trends that appear very relevant
for future macroeconomic performance in Europe. Finally, Section 4 concludes
with some conjectures and policy implications of this analysis.
2 The Model
I consider a version of Eggertsson and Mehrotra’s (2014) three period OLG
model, extended to include: i) exogenous technical progress and ii) a public
sector accumulating debt in order to implement some income transfers across
generations. The focus is mainly on how savings decisions and demand for
credit determine the natural interest rate, and to that end, both productivity
growth and inter-generational transfers by fiscal policy are important factors to
consider.
2.1 Households
At each moment, three generations (young, y, middle, m, and old, o) coexist.
The size of the young generation at t is denoted by Nyt , and exogenously grows
at rate nt. Hence, N
y
t = (1 + nt)N
y
t−1 = (1 + nt)N
m
t = (1 + nt)(1 + nt−1)N
o
t .
The young generation is credit constrained, does not produce, and receives
no income. Therefore, to consume they borrow from the middle generation, up
to a limit Dyt (inclusive of interest payments).
The middle generation provides labour (inelastically), receives all income
(labour earnings and capital income, Y ), and saves: i) to pay for debt accu-
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The Euler equation for consumption is:
1
cmt
= β 1 + rt
cot+1
while consumption of the young and old generations is determined by the
corresponding budget constraints:
mulated while young, ii) to buy capital (at price pk), iii) to lend to the young
generation (Bmt ), and iv) to hold public bonds (B
g
t ). Capital depreciates at rate
δ.
There is a public sector that taxes income at rate τ t and spends Nmt Gt, to
be financed by tax revenues, τ tYt, and (one-period) bonds held by the middle
generation, Nmt B
g
t . Public expenditures are assumed to be spent in providing
income to the old generation (as in a Pay-As-You-Go pension system).
The old generation consumes all of its savings (plus interest receipts) and
government transfers.7
Thus, the household’s problem is:
max
{cyt ,cmt+1,cot+2}
Et[log c
y
t + β log cmt+1 + β2 log cot+2]
s.t. cyt ≤ B
y
t ; (1 + rt)B
y
t ≤ Dt
cmt+1 + p
k
t+1
Kt+1
Nmt+1
+ (1 + rt)B
y
t = (1− τ t+1)
Yt+1
Nmt+1
− (Bgt+1 +Bmt+1)
cot+2 = p
k
t+2(1− δ)
Kt+1
Nmt+1
+ (1 + rt+1)(B
g
t+1 +B
m
t+1) +
Nmt+2
Not+2
Gt+2
cyt =
Dt
1 + rt
cot = p
k
t kt−1(1− δ) + (1 + rt−1)(B
g
t−1 +B
m
t−1) +
Nmt
Not
Gt
where kt−1 =
Kt−1
Nmt−1
. Thus, savings (per member of the middle generation,
excluding capital investment) at time t are given by:
−(Bmt +B
g
t ) =
β
1 + β
?
(1− τ t)yt −Dt−1 − pkt kt
?
− 1
1 + β
1 + nt
1 + rt
Gt+1−
1
1 + β
(1− δ)pkt+1kt
1 + rt
while the demand for loans is the sum of the (private) debt constraint for
the young generation and the supply of (public) bonds:
Nyt Dt
1 + rt
+Nmt B
g
t
7For simplicity and without loss of generality, I leave aside mortality risk and changes in
retirement age that affect the relative size of the old cohort. When discussing population
projections in Section 3, I consider to what extent changes in retirement age would alter the
size of inter-generational transfers from the working to the retired population.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1522
rkt =
(1− α)(1− τ t)yt
kt
(2)
As for capital, the corresponding Euler equation is:
pkt − rkt
cmt
=
β[pkt+1(1− δt)]
cot+1
Hence, the arbitrage condition linking the rental rate of capital and the real
interest rate is:
2.2 Public debt dynamics
The accumulation of public debt is straightforward: the supply of public bonds
is the sum of the bonds issued in the previous period, interest payments, and
the primary deficit to be financed at each period:
Nmt B
g
t = N
m
t−1B
g
t−1(1 + rt−1) +N
m
t Gt − τ tYt
Bgt =
1 + rt−1
1 + nt−1
Bgt−1 +Gt − τ t
Yt
Nmt
Hence, the debt-to-GDP ratio (b = NmBg/Y ) is given by
bgt =
1 + rt−1
1 + nt−1
yt−1
yt
bgt−1 + gt − τ t
where y = Y/Nm and g = G/y.
2.3 Supply side
The production function is Cobb-Douglas and there is exogenous technical
progress (indexed by At, growing at the exogenous rate at). Labour supply
is inelastic, so that employment is given by proportion of the middle generation
who is working:
Yt = AtK
1−α
t L
α
t ; Lt = (1− ut)Nmt
where ut is the unemployment rate. Normalised by the size of the middle gen-
eration, Nmt , the production function can be written as follows
yt = Atk
1−α
t (1− ut)α
Labour and capital demand conditions are given by:
wt =
αyt
1− ut
(1)
(3)rkt = p
k
t −
(1− δ)pkt+1
1 + rt
≥ 0
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For the given current and future price of capital and the depreciation rate,
this equation gives the impact of the real interest rate on capital accumulation,
assuming away financial distortions that could introduce an additional wedge
between the real interest rate and the rental rate of capital. Combining equa-
tions (1) to (3) with the production function yields the following relationship:
1
1 + rt
=
pkt −?At(1− τ t)w
α
α−1
t
(1− δ)pkt+1
(4)
where ?A = (1− α)α α1−αA 11−α .
2.4 Wage and price determination
Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) consider downwards nominal wage rigidity, so
that wages are given by:
Wt = max
?
Wt, PtFL(Kt, N
m
t )
?
Wt = γWt−1 + (1− γ)PtFL(Kt, Nmt )
Alternatively, I also consider the possibility of wages being constrained by
real rigidities.8 In this case, I assume that the real wage cannot decrease below
a certain level, wt, because of the existence of wage norms or imperfections in
the labour market, and, hence, the prevailing wage is given by
wt = max {wt, FL(Kt, Nmt )}
2.5 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is determined by a Taylor rule with a Zero Lower Bound (hence-
forth, ZLB) on the policy nominal interest rate, while the Fisher equation relates
nominal and real interest rates, so that, respectively:
1 + it = max
?
1, (1 + i∗t )
?
Πt
Π∗
?φπ?
1 + rt =
1 + it
Πt+1
; Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
where i∗t , Π
∗ and φπ are policy parameters.
2.6 Full employment equilibrium
Consider first the case in which neither wage rigidities nor the ZLB are binding.
In this case, the economy is at full employment, and the real interest rate, rft,,
is determined by the condition equating supply and demands for loans, i.e.:
8 See Shimer (2012) on the relevance of real wage rigidities in generating jobless recoveries.
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1+rft =
1 + i∗
Π∗
=
(1 + β)[(1 + nt)dt + (1− δ)pkt+1 ktyt ] + (τ t+1 + b
g
t+1)(1 + nt)
yt+1
yt
β[α(1− τ t)− dt−1 yt−1yt − b
g
t ]
(5)
demand for loans, while the future one, increases expected transfers to the
old generation, so that high debt ratios push the natural rate up.9
9Under a specification of the utility function giving rise to precautionary savings, there will
be an additional negative effect on savings from increasing uncertainty over future productivity
growth, price of capital, taxes and public debt ratios.
where d = D/y.
The previous equation provides several insights into the channels thorugh
which the different factors enter into the determination of the natural real in-
terest rate. These factors, some already highlighted by Eggertsson and Mehrotra
(2014), with others somewhat neglected in their analysis, are:
• The population growth rate: as population growth falls (nt), the natural
interest rate falls, since there are fewer young people demanding credit.
Notice however that there is another effect of population growth on the
natural interest rate. First, as population growth falls, expected transfers
to the old generation also fall, since the relative size of the middle gener-
ation to finance those transfers will be smaller. This implies lower future
income for the old generation and, thus, an increase in savings that pushes
down the natural interest rate even further.
• (Current and next-period) Productivity growth rates. A higher current
productivity growth rate, at, increases savings since it allows the mid-
dle generation to pay for its debt accumulated while young using a lower
fraction of its income and, hence, disposable income available for savings
is higher, and the natural rate is lower. Higher next-period productiv-
ity growth, at+1, decreases savings since expected transfers to the older
generation are higher, for given tax rates and debt ratios, and, thus, the
natural interest rate is higher.
• The future value of capital: a decrease in the price of capital or a higher
depreciation rate decrease the equilibrium real interest rate, since future
expected income by the middle generation is lower, and, hence, its savings
are higher.
• Private debt. The lower the demand for credit by the young generation,
dt, the lower the equilibrium real interest rate. Also, the lower the pri-
vate debt accumulated by the middle generation while young, the higher
savings are, and, thus, the lower the natural rate is.
• (Current and next-period) Tax rates and public debt ratios. A higher
current tax rate crowds out savings by lowering disposable income, and,
hence, increases the natural rate. A higher next-period tax rate also
crowds out savings by increasing expected future income, also pushing
the natural rate up. As for the debt ratios, the current one increases the
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Finally, notice that with full depreciation (δ = 1) and a constant price of
capital, yf grows at the same rate as technical progress, and thus
1+rft =
(1 + nt)(1 + at)[(1 + β)dt + (τ t+1 + bgt+1)(1 + at+1)]
β[(α(1− τ t)− bgt )(1 + at)− dt−1]
(6)
Therefore, under stationary fiscal policy (constant bg and, τ) and constant
population and productivity growth, the change in the natural rate after a
permanent deleveraging shock is
rft+1 − r
f
t ≈
(dt − dt−1)/dt
[α(1− τ)− bg](1 + a)/dt − 1
Thus, a negative permanent deleveraging shock (dt < dt−1) reduces the real
interest rate by more, the lower the disposable income of the medium generation
is (i.e., disposable income after repaying debt and buying public bonds). With
decreasing population and productivity growth, the impact of the deleveraging
shock on the natural rate is even higher, as savings would increase by even more,
since expected future income falls. Notice also, that the impact of the (private
deleveraging shock) on the natural rate is greater, the higher the public debt
ratio is. Assuming some plausible parameter values, merely for illustrative pur-
poses, the factor in the relationship between the variation in the natural rate
and the proportional change in the debt-to-income ratio is of the order of 0.2.10
Thus, for a reduction in the initial debt-to-income ratio of the middle generation
of 10%, the natural rate would fall by 2 percentage points. Figure 1 gives the
(annual) natural interest rate implied by equation (6) for alternative popula-
tion and productivity growth rates and debt-to-income ratios, under plausible
values for the rest of the parameters (time discount rate 2% per annum, inter-
generational transfers of 8% of GDP and a labour share of 2/3). It shows that
for low productivity growth (1% per annum) and low accumulation of private
debt (d=5%), the natural rate can reach significant negative values even at not
so low population growth rates.
In any case, if accommodated by monetary policy through a fall in the nomi-
nal rate, the fall of the natural interest rate has no unemployment consequences.
As the real rate is lower, capital accumulation is higher, and output is at its full
employment level, inflation is at its target, and nominal wages adjust for real
wages to reach the level compatible with full employment.
910Taking α = 2/3, Intergenerational transfers, τ+b = 8%, a = 2%, and d = 0.1. Notice that
the debt-to-income ratio is the debt to be paid by the middle generation over a long-period
of time (say 30 years) relative to GDP per member of that cohort.
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2.7 The constrained regime
I now consider the effects of a deleveraging shock when the ZLB and wage
rigidities are binding, and population and productivity growth are declining.
First, suppose that monetary policy is either unable to accommodate a fall in
the real interest rate into negative territory, because nominal rates cannot fall
below zero, or unwilling to pursue unconventional measures to raise inflation. As
for wage rigidities, I will consider two cases: i) downward nominal wage rigidity,
and ii) downwards real wage rigidity.
Downward nominal wage rigidity. Suppose now that both the ZLB and
nominal wages are downwardly rigid, so that
Wt = γWt−1 + (1− γ)αPtAt
?
kft
?1−α
, with Wt−1 > αPtAt
?
kft
?1−α
In this case, the real interest rate is above the natural rate, and output and
employment are below the full employment levels.
wt = γΠ−1t wt−1 + (1− γ)w
f
t , being Π
−1
t wt−1 > w
f
t
Πt+1 =
pkt −?At(1− τ t)
?
γΠ−1t wt−1 + (1− γ)w
f
t
? α
α−1
(1− δ)pkt+1
=
=
β[(1− τ t)α− dt−1 yt−1yt − b
g
t ]
(1 + β)[(1 + nt)dt + (1− δ)pkt+1 ktyt ] + (τ t+1 + b
g
t+1)(1 + nt)
yt+1
yt
Downward real wage rigidity. Let us now assume that real wages are
downwardly rigid, because of some wage norms or some imperfection in the
labour market creating a constant mark-up of wages over prices. Alternatively,
unemployment hysteresis, due to insider effects on wage-setting or to deprecia-
tion of long-term unemployed skills, may raise structural unemployment, putting
a floor on real wages. In these cases,
wt = wt > αAt
?
kft
?1−α
Πt+1 =
pkt −?At(1− τ t)w
α
α−1
t
(1− δ)pkt+1
=
β[(1− τ t)α− dt−1 yt−1yt − b
g
t ]
(1 + β)[(1 + nt)dt + (1− δ)pkt+1 ktyt ] + (τ t+1 + b
g
t+1)(1 + nt)
yt+1
yt
As before, the real interest rate is above the natural rate, and output and
employment are below the full employment levels. The significant difference
with respect to the previous case is that now inflation does not affect real wages,
and, hence, aggregate supply does not vary with current inflation.
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yt =
?
1 + β
β + τ t
??
(1 + nt)DtΠt+1 +
βDt−1 + pkt kt
1 + β + (1 + nt)Πt+1Gt+1 +
Πt+1(1− δ)pkt+1kt
1 + β
?
+
+
?
1 + β
β + τ t
??
1− δ
1 + nt−1
pkt kt−1 +B
g
t +
Dt−1
1 + nt−1
+ (1 + nt−1)τ tyt
?
+
+
?
1 + β
β + τ t
?
pkt
?
kt −
(1− δ)kt−1
1 + nt−1
?
In any of the two cases (under nominal or real rigidities) the equation for
inflation determines yt given predetermined yt−1 and expected yt+1. Thus, for
in time when the 5-year growth rates of the population cohorts aged 45-69 and
over 70 would also be around unity.
11Data are from the Population Division of the United Nations (World Population Prospects:
The 2012 Revision), under the medium fertility assumption.
instance, lower population growth and lower productivity growth (lower ex-
pected yt+1) yields lower yt. Also a deleveraging shock (a reduction in dt)
implies lower yt. Finally, a higher real wage, increases inflation, aggregate de-
mand, and, hence, yt Thus, under the constrained regime there is no trade-off
between unemployment and inflation.
Alternatively, output can also be determined by adding up consumption of
the three generations and capital investment, which yields the following aggre-
gate demand relationship:
3 Potential Growth, (Private and Public) Debt,
and Inter-generational Transfers in Europe
3.1 Population growth
Figure 2 plots the forecasts of the (gross) rate of growth of population (1 + nt,
over five-year periods) of three population cohorts (20-44, 45-69 and over 70
years of age) that may resemble the three overlapping generations considered
in the model in Section 2. I consider four different areas (World, Europe, More
developed regions, and Less developed regions) and take the data from Popu-
lation Division of the United Nations (World Population Prospects: The 2012
Revision)11 As can be seen, the world is undergoing a long period of declining
population growth. The 5-year gross growth rate for the population aged 20-44
would fall from 1.09 to approximately 1 at the end of the century, a moment
Yt = NtDtΠt+1 +
+Nt−1
?
(1− τ t)yt + βDt−1 + pkt kt
1 + β + (1 + nt)Πt+1Gt+1] +
Πt+1(1− δ)pkt+1kt
1 + β
?
+
+Nt−2[p
k
t (1− δ)kt−1 +ΠtB
g
t +Dt−1 + (1 + nt−1)Gt] +
+Nt−1p
k
t
?
kt −
(1− δ)kt−1
1 + nt−1
?
which in per-capita terms (per member of the middle generation) is:
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In the case of Europe, population growth is going to be much lower and, in
fact, it is already negative for the population cohort aged 20-44. Looking ahead,
population aged 45-69 would start decreasing around 2025, when the 5-year gross
growth rate of the younger cohort would be 0.95. This represents a significant
decrease relative to the last decades of the 20th century, when (gross) growth
rate of the younger population was around 1.05. With gross population growth
rate around 0.95, productivity growth would have to be around 1% (per annum)
for the product of (1 + n) and (1 + a) to be close to 1.
Figure 3 shows that the decrease in the size of younger population cohorts
is common to a great extent to all countries across Europe (only in Northern
Europe is total population growth expected to be positive throughout the next
century). As a result, the ratio of the over-65 population to the working age
population (20-64) would rise to over 40% in all European areas, reaching almost
70% in Southern Europe. This would further decrease the natural interest rate
through the fall in inter-generational transfers that, in the absence of more
accumulation of public debt, such a drastic change in the relative size of the
retired population would imply (more on this below in Subsection 3.3).
3.2 Productivity growth and capital accumulation
Taking the model in Section 2 literally, productivity growth and capital accumu-
lation affect the natural interest rate mostly by their positive impact on future
expected income. An additional effect of productivity growth is to increase
disposable income to pay for the accumulated private debt of the young gen-
eration. Recent developments show that Total Factor Productivity has slowed
down, while capital-output ratios are growing at lower rates. Even though Galí,
Smets and Wouters (2012) do not find any significant change in the output-
employment relationship in the aftermath of the Great Recession in the United
States, there is some evidence (Fernald, 2014) that TFP started to slow down be-
fore the Great Recession. returning to normal growth (by historical standards)
after the exceptional period of higher growth fueled by industries producing and
using IT. How TFP growth will evolve in the medium/long run is a controversial
issue.12 Were TFP growth to remain low, deleveraging would take longer and
savings would increase in anticipation of lower future expected income.
As for Europe, Figure 4 and Table 1 display the main facts. In most Euro-
pean countries, during the IT Revolution TFP did not increase as much as in
the United States (only in Sweden and Finland did it reach growth rates similar
to those in the United States). And during and after the Great Recession, TFP
growth and capital deepening seem to have almost vanished. Admittedly, there
are cyclical effects that make it difficult to correctly measure capital services
and there are additional measurement problems regarding the quality of output
12For two alternative view, see Gordon (2014) -on the negative side- and Brynjolfsson and
McAffee (2014) and Bartelsman (2013) -in the positive camp-.
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13 See Foster et al (2013) and Casado et al. (2014).
14The decomposition, similar to that used by Boldrin et al. (1999), is as follows:
P
Y
= B·R
N·(Y/N) =
POP_RET
POP_TOT
POP_TOT
N
B
Y/N
where
P : Pension Expenditures
Y : GDP
N : Employment
Y/N : Average Labour Productivity
POP_TOT : Working-Age Population
POP_RET : Population receiving pensions
B: Average pension benefit
so that pension expenditures as a % of GDP are the product of the ration of Pensioners to
working-age population and the ratio of average pension benefit to average labour productivity
divided by the employment rate (the ratio of employment to the working-age population
15Pension expenditures are a major component of transfers to the old population, but
they are not the only ones. Health expenditures are also significant and go mostly to the
old population. Hence, to the extent that health expenditures may increase in the future,
focusing only old-age pensions is likely to deliver an upper bound for the future scope for
inter-generational transfers to the older population.
and inputs (intangibles, human capital). Hence, it may be too early to assess
to what extent the slowdown of TFP in Europe is a permanent phenomenon.
Nevertheless, if, as Bartelsman (2013) argues, the future potential gains from
TFP growth would require some reallocation of resources, so far this realloca-
tion is not taking place at the rate that was observed in previous recessions.13
The lower growth of the capital-output ratio does not necessarily imply that
less capital deepening is putting a brake on productivity growth, as capital ser-
vices from the current stock of capital -if there is no massive misallocation-
can increase by means of higher utilisation rates. However, a higher utilisation
rate of capital hints at lower investment demand, which puts further downwards
pressure on the natural rate.
3.3 The scope for inter-generational transfers in Europe
An important motivation for savings is to supplement retirement income. Pub-
lic pension schemes implement inter-generational transfers which, with some
variation from country to country, amount to around 8% of GDP (as an average
for OECD countries). As shown in the first panel of Figure 5, public pension
expenditures are higher in Continental Europe, where they are typically close
to 10% of GDP, than in Anglo-Saxon countries, where pension schemes tend
to follow an (Beveridgean) assistance approach, rather than the (Bismarckian)
contributory approach prevalent in Continental European countries.
A very simple decomposition allows tthe factors that determined pension
expenditures (also displayed in Figure 5) to be identified and the extent to which
there is further scope for increasing transfers to the older population, which
would reduce savings, and, hence, increase the natural rate of interest.14 15 In
2009, for the countries presented in the Figure, the average ratio of pensioners
to working-age population was 24.3%, the average employment rate was 70%
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was 21.5%, which corresponds to average pensions expenditures as a % of GDP
of around 7.7%.
Starting from the three main determinants of pension expenditures, it is
straightforward to compute, given population forecasts and assuming a given
value for the employment rate, how much replacement ratios (old-age pension
benefits per pensioner/average labour productivity) would be for any given level
of pension expenditures (as a % of GDP). Thus, for illustrative purposes, Figure
6 displays the change in replacement ratios between 2009 and 2050 for three
different scenarios:
• Countries will have the same pension expenditures (as a % of GDP) and
the same employment rates in 2050 as in 2009 (M1)
• Countries will converge to and employment rate of 65% and keep the same
pension expenditures (as a % of GDP) of 2009 (M2).
• Countries will converge both in employment rates (65%) and in pension
expenditures (10% of GDP) (M3).
and considering two alternative definitions of the working -age population:
between 16 and 64 years (left panel) and between 16 and 69 years (right panel).
As seen in Figure 6, the reductions in replacement ratios are sizeable under
the first two scenarios, amounting to around 10 pp, when the working popula-
tion is considered to be between 16 and 64 years of age, and 6%, when working
population is that between 16 and 69 years of age Obviously, when pension
expenditures converge to 10% of GDP, Anglo-Saxon countries may even exper-
imence an increase in the replacement ratio, which could rise to more than 5
pp if, at the same time, the retirement age is raised to 70 years. But even
under these conditions, some European countries (Italy, France, Austria, and
Portugal) would have to reduce replacement ratios by almost 10 pp.
Of course, for individual savings decisions what matters is the ratio of income
during working age to income during old age, and this ratio may not decrease
even after sizeable reductions in the replacement ratios defined above, if labour
productivity grows at a significant rate. This is another channel through which
lower productivity growth would increase savings and, hence, decrease the nat-
ural rate of interest.
3.4 Household Debt
The credit expansion during the pre-crisis period and the bursting of hous-
ing bubbles in several European countries have left some European households
highly indebted.16 Figure 7 displays the proportion of indebted households,
(median) debt-to-income ratios and (median) net wealth by age group (which
to some extent resemble the age cohort classification in the model presented in
and the average ratio of pension benefit per pensioner to labour productivity
16See Bover, et al. (2014) for the incidence of household debt across European countries
and to what extent demographics and institutional factors explain its cross-country variation.
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Section 2) in the European countries for which microeconomic data are avail-
able.17
Since middle-age households also present high debt-to-income ratios and low
net wealth in several countries, a need for further deleveraging in the forthcom-
ing years may be expected, which would push savings up and real interest rates
further down. For instance, Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2012) interpret the
recent (2008-2011) increase in the US saving rate using a buffer-stock model
of optimal consumption with labour income uncertainty, under which saving is
determined by the gap between target and actual wealth, to conclude that it is
very unlikely that the US personal saving rate could return to its low pre-crisis
period level. Moreover, for Europe and in some contrast to the United States,
household debt deleveraging during the crisis has been small, which suggests
that more deleveraging shocks are still to come.18
to some extent resemble the age cohort classification in the model presented in
4 Concluding remarks
The Great Recession and the subsequent European crisis have left the Euro-
pean economy in a dismal situation. The legacy of these events (high public
and private debt, high unemployment and competitiveness misalignments) will
have to be addressed in a context of lower population ageing and uncertain pro-
ductivity growth. The combination of the legacy and future demographic and
economic prospects suggest that it is very plausible that the natural interest
rate has fallen significantly, perhaps to a level that monetary policy is unable to
accommodate, and may remain at that level for a long period In this constrained
regime, there is a permanent shortfall of demand that pushes the economy into
a high-unemployment trap.
In this paper I have used a simple OLG model, in which the natural interest
is determined by the balance between savings and investment, to show that the
combination of high debt and low population and productivity growth pushes
monetary policy into the Zero Lower Bound and may lead the economy to a
long-lasting period of high unemployment. Among all the factors determining
the natural interest rate, only a revival of productivity growth seems within
the scope of policy to revert this situation. This is perhaps "structural reforms
" are back at the top of proposals for policy agendas in Europe. But even
with structural reforms yielding higher productivity growth, it seems that, as L.
Summers put it, the economy is entering a period in which the cyclical fluctua-
tions would be minor relative to more permanent trends, or more drastically, as
Alvin Hansen put it, this time indeed "the Western world is undergoing in this
generation a structural change no less basic and profound in character than that
transformation of economic life and institutions which we are wont to designate
loosely by the phrase "the Industrial Revolution" ’.
17The data are from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/researcher_hfcn.en.htm
18See also Buttiglione et al. (2014)
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Figure?1.?Natural?interest?rate?under?alternative?sets?of?parameter?values
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Figure?2.?World?Population?Growth,?by?areas?and?age?groups?(5?years?gross?growth?rates)?
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Figure?3.?Population?Growth?in?Europe?(growth?rates?over?5?year?periods)?
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Figure?4.?TFP?and?Capital?Output?Ratios?
?
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Figure?5.?Public?Pension?Expenditures?and?its?determinants?
?
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Source:?OECD?(first?three?panels).?Last?panel?computed?as?a?residual?from?the?equation?in?footnote?12.?
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Figure?6.?Variations?(pp)?in?pension?replacement?ratios?under?alternative?scenarios?(2009?2050)?
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Figure?7.?Household?debt?and?net?wealth?by?age?groups?
?
Source:?HFCS?
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Table?1.?TFP?Growth?by?periods?
?
Source:?OECD?
?
?
1995-
2011
2007-
2011
1995-
2012
2001-
2007
2007-
2012
Australia 0,8 -0,1 0,8 0,2 0,1
Austria 0,9 0,1 0,9 1,4 0,1
Belgium 0,3 -0,6 0,2 0,8 -0,6
Canada 0,6 0,2 0,6 0,4 0,1
Denmark -0,2 -0,8 .. 0,4 ..
Finland 1,6 -0,9 1,4 2,3 -1
France 0,7 -0,3 0,6 0,9 -0,3
Germany 0,9 0 0,8 1,1 0,1
Ireland 2,3 0,5 2,2 1,3 0,4
Italy -0,1 -0,6 -0,2 -0,3 -0,8
Japan 0,6 0,2 0,7 1 0,4
Korea 3,3 3,3 2,9 3,4 2,1
Netherlands 0,4 -0,7 .. 0,9 ..
New Zealand 0,6 0,2 0,6 0,4 0,2
Portugal 0,2 0 .. -0,1 ..
Spain 0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,4
Sweden 1,2 -0,4 1,2 2,2 -0,2
United Kingdom 0,9 -1,1 .. 1,7 ..
United States 1,3 1 1,3 1,4 0,9
Average annual growth/change, selected periods, in %
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